Accepted Contributions

  • Benjamin Aminof and Sasha Rubin.
    Cycle Games.
  • Guillaume Aucher, Bastien Maubert, and Sophie Pinchinat.
    Automata Techniques for Epistemic Protocol Synthesis.
  • Francesco Belardinelli.
    Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies: Epistemic Strategy Logic.
  • Dietmar Berwanger and Anup Basil Mathew.
    Games with Recurring Certainty.
  • Piero Bonatti, Marco Faella, and Luigi Sauro.
    Partial Preferences for Mediated Bargaining.
  • Patricia Bouyer, Nicolas Markey, and Steen Vester.
    Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial Observation.
  • Véronique Bruyère, Emmanuel Filiot, Mickael Randour and Jean-Francois Raskin.
    Expectations or Guarantees? I Want It All! A Crossroad Between Games and MDPs.
  • Krishnendu Chatterjee, Laurent Doyen, Emmanuel Filiot, and Jean-Francois Raskin.
    Doomsday Equilibria for Omega-Regular Games.
  • Lluis Godo and Enrico Marchioni.
    Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations.
  • Dimitar Guelev.
    Refining and Delegating Strategic Ability in ATL.
  • Xiaowei Huang and Ron van der Meyden.
    An Epistemic Strategy Logic.
  • Wojtek Jamroga, Matthijs Melissen, and Henning Schnoor.
    Defendable Security in Interaction Protocols.
  • Xiang Jiang and Arno Pauly.
    Decomposing Bimatrix Games.
  • Clàudia Nalon, Lan Zhang, Clare Dixon, and Ullrich Hustadt.
    A Resolution Prover for Coalition Logic.*
    (*formerly, A Resolution Calculus for Coalition Logics.)